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Abstract 
This Note will describe a brief history of the 
legal attempts to restrict the paparazzi and the legis-
lative history behind A.B. 3592 and its amendment, 
S.B. 606.  The bills are controversial and have re-
ceived a significant amount of criticism, due to the 
fact that they restrict speech by essentially prohibit-
ing paparazzi, known for their harassing behavior, 
from taking pictures of the children of celebrities.  
The Note will conclude with an analysis utilizing the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine of whether the bill is in 
violation of the First Amendment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a young child who is terrorized be-
cause of her parents’ occupation by peers, neighbors, 
or even strangers.  They are constantly asking her 
questions, making derogatory comments about her 
parents, physically attacking her, and even jumping 
from behind trees or cars to frighten her.  She is 
emotionally traumatized and terrified to go outside 
to play with her friends, go to school, or visit the local 
shopping mall.  It is hard to imagine how a parent 
can cope with this situation.  One way for parents to 
prevent this is by changing their occupations.  But 
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for most parents, this is not an option.  Something 
should be done to prevent this type of harassment. 
California recognized that children are har-
assed because of their parents’ occupations.  This is 
especially the case for parents who are entertainers, 
public officials, or law enforcement officers.  Since 
the advent of America’s fascination with celebrities 
in the press and social media, there have been nu-
merous reports of members of the media doing al-
most anything in their power to capture and publish 
the image of a celebrity’s child.1  For example, many 
tabloid magazines are willing to pay millions of dol-
lars to feature the first image of a celebrity’s new-
born baby on the cover of their magazine.  In July 
2013, Newsday reported that Brad Pitt and Angelina 
Jolie received $15 million for the first images of their 
twins, Knox Leon & Vivienne Marcheline.2 
The media chases and harasses celebrity par-
ents who want to keep their child out of the spotlight 
so that they can photograph the celebrity’s child.  For 
example, Beyoncé Knowles and Jay-Z decided not to 
sell the image of their daughter, Blue Ivy, to the me-
dia.3  As a result, the media relentlessly tried to pho-
                                                             
1 “Celebrity” is a broad term that describes a famous person.  
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 231 (4th ed. 
2004). 
2 Lacey Rose, In Pictures: Most Expensive Celebrity Pictures, 
FORBES (July 1, 2009, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/01/michael-jackson-magazine-
business-media-jackson_slide_2.html; Celebrity Baby Scoop, 10 
Most Expensive Celebrity Photos to Date, NEWSDAY (July 10, 
2013, 7:00 AM) http://long-island.newsday.com/kids/long-island-
parent-talk-1.3679226/10-most-expensive-celebrity-baby-
photos-to-date-1.5612593. 
3 Sarah Fitzmaurice & Nadia Mendoza, ‘She Wanted to Do It 
This Way’: Beyoncé’s Friend, Celebrity Stylist June Ambrose, 
Reveals Why Singer and Jay-Z Chose to Forfeit Price Tag on 
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tograph the baby girl.  To protect her child from the 
paparazzi,4  Beyoncé covered little Blue’s face with a 
blanket or pressed her daughter’s face into her chest 
when out in public.5  These images are seen in al-
most every candid image posted of the mega-star and 
her daughter.6 
For the most part, there are no reports of Be-
yoncé or her child being physically harmed by the 
paparazzi in their unrelenting attempts to photo-
graph her daughter.  But the media can be overly ag-
gressive and cause severe damage, which was unfor-
tunately demonstrated in 1997 when Princess Diana 
was killed.7  More recently in 2011, Tori Spelling, 
who was pregnant at the time, was chased by the pa-
parazzi while driving her children to school and 
crashed into the wall of her children’s school.8  How-
                                                                                                                             
First Pictures of Blue, MAIL ONLINE (Feb. 12, 2012, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-2100081/Blue-Ivy-
Carter-pictures-Beyonce-Jay-Z-chose-forfeit-price-tag-baby-
photos.html. 
4 The term “paparazzi” is the plural word for paparazzo. A 
paparazzo is a “freelance photographer who pursues celebrities 
to take candid pictures for sale to magazines and newspapers.” 
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1006 (4th ed. 
2004). 
5 Nadia Mendoza, Cute Feet – But We Want to See Her Face! 
Jay-Z Keeps Blue Ivy Covered Up as Her Little Legs Poke Out 
Beneath Protective Blanket, MAIL ONLINE (June 4, 2012, 10:32 
AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-2154460/Jay-
Z-keeps-Blue-Ivy-covered-little-legs-poke-beneath-protective-
blanket.html. 
6 Id. 
7 The Learning Network, Aug. 31, 1997 Princess Diana Is 
Killed Car Crash, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2011, 4:41 AM), 
http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/aug-31-1997-
princess-diana-is-killed-in-car-crash/. 
8 Nancy Dillon, Tori Spelling Gets in ‘Pretty Big’ Car Crash: 
Pregnant Star Blames Paparazzo for Causing Accident, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (July 14, 2011, 9:23 AM), 
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ever, the crash did not stop the aggressive photogra-
phers.  The photographers continued to snap pictures 
after she collided with the building.9  They were 
eventually chased away by other parents.10  Fortu-
nately, the damage was minimal. 
Children of celebrities are not the only chil-
dren targeted by overzealous individuals.  Families 
of law enforcement officials are also threatened with 
violence and harassed by individuals who are resent-
ful towards law enforcement officers.11  For example, 
in February 2013, Christopher Dorner targeted po-
lice officers and their families, stating in his manifes-
to that he intended to “destroy, exploit and seize des-
ignated targets.”12  Dorner was a former Los Angeles 
Police Department (LAPD) Officer whose employ-
ment was terminated after he accused his training 
officer of assaulting a mentally ill man.13  A year af-
ter the LAPD disciplinary panel terminated his em-
ployment, the Los Angeles County Superior Court 
                                                                                                                             
http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/tori-spelling-
pretty-big-car-crash-pregnant-star-blames-paparazzo-causing-
accident-article-1.131844; Tim Kenneally, Pregnant Tori 
Spelling Survives Accident After Paparazzi Chase, WRAP (June 
13, 2011, 5:07 PM), 
http://www.thewrap.com/tv/article/pregnant-tori-spelling-
survives-accident-after-paparazzi-chase-28199. 
9 Kenneally, supra note 8. 
10 Id.  
11 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. Comm. on 
Pub. Safety, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 4 (Cal. 2013). 
12 Joel Rubin et al., Investigators Focus on What Makes 
Dorner Tick, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/11/local/la-me-dorner-hunt-
20130211. 
13 Jack Leonard et al., Dorner’s LAPD Firing Case Hinged on 
Credibility, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/10/local/la-me-lapd-dorner-
20130211. 
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reexamined his case and determined that the disci-
plinary committee did not have sufficient evidence to 
terminate Dorner’s employment.  However, the court 
did not overturn the disciplinary panel’s decision to 
fire Dorner.14  As a result, Dorner vowed to seek re-
venge in his online manifesto.  In the manifesto he 
claimed that he was “unjustly fired” and that “[the 
disciplinary panel members] lack of ethics and 
conspir[acy] to wrong a just individual are over.”15  
He further stated that the panel members’ unjust 
behavior would result in “deadly consequences” for 
them and their loved ones.16  Dorner killed several 
people, including a police officer, a sheriff’s deputy 
and the daughter of a former LAPD Captain, who de-
fended Dorner at the disciplinary hearing.17  Other 
police officers, such as Phil Tingirides, a LAPD Cap-
tain who was a member of the disciplinary panel that 
                                                             
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Jens Erik Gould, After Christopher Dorner, What Next for 
the LAPD?, TIME (Feb. 14, 2013), 
http://nation.time.com/2013/02/14/after-christopher-dorner-
what-next-for-the-lapd/ (“Dorner is suspected of killing a total of 
four people,, including a Riverside, Calif., police officer, a San 
Bernardino sheriff’s deputy and the daughter of a former police 
captain, all part of a one-man war against the Los Angeles 
Police Department over what he called the force’s ‘lying, racism’ 
and ‘cover-ups.’”); Jack Leonard et al., Police Say Ex-Cop Was 
Bent on Exacting Revenge, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2013),  
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/07/local/la-me-dorner-
profile-20130207/2 (“Dorner spent the next couple of years 
unsuccessfully appealing his termination. Then, this week, 
police say, Dorner made good on his threat to seek revenge 
when he fatally shot the daughter of an ex-LAPD captain who 
represented him at his discipline hearing. He also allegedly 
shot her fiancé. Dorner went on to fatally shoot one officer and 
injure two others, police say.”). 
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terminated Dorner’s employment, had round-the-
clock protection for his six foster children during the 
hunt for Dorner.18 
Despite the outrageousness of this type of be-
havior, the law does not offer much protection from 
obsessive individuals who threaten and harass chil-
dren because of their parents’ identity.  There are 
statutes that punish threats that result in a felony, 
such as Section 422 of California’s Penal Code.19  But 
parents do not want to wait until their child is physi-
cally harmed.  They want to deter individuals from 
behaving in a manner that would cause their chil-
dren emotional and psychological harm.  Whether it 
is unwarranted attention from the media or threats 
from individuals seeking revenge, parents want legal 
protection that will deter others from harassing their 
children. 
Almost twenty years ago, California passed 
A.B. 3592, codified as Penal Code Section 11414, to 
protect children from individuals who harassed them 
because of their parents’ occupations.20  However, 
many argued that this law was not effective in deter-
ring individuals because of its “relatively weak pen-
alties.”21  As a result, a California senator presented 
a bill, S.B. 606, to amend Penal Code Section 11414 
in early 2013.22  This amendment is very similar to 
the existing law as it prohibits harassment of a child 
                                                             
18 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the S. Rules Comm., 2013-
14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 3-4 (Cal. 2013). 
19 CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (West 2013). 
20 A.B.. 3592, 1993-1994 Leg., Reg. Sess., (Cal.1994) (enacted). 
21 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. Comm. on 
Pub. Safety, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 4 (Cal. 2013). 
22 S.B. 606, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (enacted). 
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because of his parent’s occupation.23  However, the 
biggest difference between the existing law and the 
amendment is that the criminal penalties are en-
hanced.24  In September 2013, the California State 
Legislature passed the amendment and the Governor 
signed it into law.25 
This Note will focus on whether Penal Code 
Section 11414, as amended, will protect children, 
specifically children of celebrities, from the paparaz-
zi, without violating the press’ right to due process.  
According to critics of the amendment, the new law 
violates the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which de-
rived from the due process clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment.26  Under the void-for-
vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute will be void if 
it does not provide clear notice of the prohibited be-
havior.27  Without clear notice, the law will not be 
                                                             
23 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. Comm. on 
Judiciary, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. at 2 (Cal. 2013). 
24 Id. at 3. 
25 Patrick McGreevy and Melanie Mason, Gov. Brown Signs 
Bills Aimed at Paparazzi, Family Leave and Quakes, L.A. TIMES 
(Sep. 24, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/24/local/la-
me-brown-bills-paparazzi-20130925. 
26 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (holding that 
“[t]he statute, as drafted and as construed by the state court, is 
unconstitutionally vague on its face within the meaning of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to 
clarify what is contemplated [. . . ].”). 
27 Connally v. General Construction, 269 U.S. 385, 391 
(1926)(stating “[t]hat the terms of a penal statute creating a 
new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who 
are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them 
liable to its penalties is a well-recognized requirement, 
consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the 
settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or 
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
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enforced. 
In this Note, I will first describe a brief history 
of the legal attempts to restrict the paparazzi in sec-
tion I. Next, I will discuss the legislative history be-
hind the existing law and its amendment in sections 
II and III.  Finally, I will analyze whether the bill 
fails the void-for-vagueness doctrine in section IV. 
 
 
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF LEGAL ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT 
CELEBRITIES 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
protects the press’ right to photograph celebrities, 
and to some extent, those associated with them.  It 
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or the press.”28  Leg-
islators must balance the press’ First Amendment 
rights with the celebrity’s right to privacy when 
drafting a bill that protects celebrities from the pa-
parazzi.29  Some justifications for enumerating a 
                                                                                                                             
differ as to its application violates the first essential of due 
process of law.”) (citing International Harvester Co. v. 
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1926)). 
28 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
29 Although the “right to privacy” is not expressly stated in 
the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the 
right to privacy was a fundamental right in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  According to Justice Douglas, 
“[t]he foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the 
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from 
those guarantees that help give them life and substances.  
Various guarantees create zones of privacy [. . .]. We have had 
many controversies over these penumbral rights of privacy and 
repose.  These cases bear witness that the right of privacy 
which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one.” Id. at 
480.  As such, Justice Douglas held in this case that a 
Connecticut statute banning married couples from using 
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separate right for the press in the First Amendment 
are that the press has a very unique role in inform-
ing the public and, according to the Supreme Court, 
without separate protection, the public would be de-
nied access to significant information.30 
Although the Constitution recognizes separate 
protection for the press, the federal and state courts 
have taken the approach that the press is not enti-
tled to special protection from generally applicable 
laws.31  For example, in Branzburg v. Hayes, the 
Court refused to create a shield that protected re-
porters from revealing their sources.32  While courts 
are reluctant to create special privileges for the 
                                                                                                                             
contraceptives was unconstitutional because it violated their 
right to privacy.  Id. at 485-86. 
30 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (stating that 
“[w]e do not question the significance of free speech, press, or 
assembly to the country’s welfare.  Nor is it suggested that 
news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment 
protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, 
freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”); see also ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICES 
1214 (Vicki Been et al., eds., 4th ed. 2011) (discussion of Hayes). 
31 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682-683 (according to Justice White,  
“[i]t is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate 
every incidental burdening of the press that may result from 
the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general 
applicability.  Under prior cases, otherwise valid laws serving 
substantial public interests may be enforced against the press 
as against others, despite the possible burden that may be 
imposed.  The Court has emphasized that the publisher of a 
newspaper has no special immunity from the application of 
general laws.”). 
32 Id. at 709 (holding that where the reporter refused to reveal 
his sources before a grand jury, the “petitioner must appear 
before the grand jury to answer the questions put to him [. . 
.].”); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30 at 1214-20 (discussing 
cases in which the Court refused to grant the press special 
privileges.). 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014) 
Protecting a Celebrity’s Child From Harassment 
569 
press, they recognize that the press has the right to 
report on matters of public significance.33  When the 
matter of public significance involves a public person, 
including a celebrity, the Court has expanded the 
First Amendment to protect the press’ freedom to 
publish information.34 
Unlike the average person, celebrities have a 
limited right to privacy.  In 1974, the U.S. Supreme 
Court articulated in a defamation action, that 
“[t]hose who, by reason of the notoriety of their 
achievements or the vigor and success with which 
they seek the public’s attention, are properly classed 
as public figures [. . .].” 35  The Court recognized that 
there are different types of public figures by stating 
that an all-purpose public figure was one who 
“achieve[s] such pervasive fame or notoriety that he 
becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all 
contexts.”36  However, a limited public figure is “an 
individual [who] voluntarily injects himself or is 
drawn into a particular public controversy and 
thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of 
                                                             
33 Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) 
(stating that “if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful 
information about a matter of public significance then state 
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the 
information, absent a need to further a state interest of the 
highest order.”). 
34 See Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) 
(stating that “[i]n our continuing effort to define the proper 
accommodation between [the need for a vigorous and 
uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing 
wrongful injury], we have been especially anxious to assure to 
the freedoms of speech and press that ‘breathing space’ 
essential to their fruitful exercise.”) (citing NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 351. 
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issues.”37  These figures have relinquished their right 
to privacy and can recover damages if they satisfy 
the elements for one, or more, of the four separate 
categories of invasion of privacy.  The categories are 
an “(1) intrusion upon a person’s seclusion or soli-
tude; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) publici-
ty that places a person is a false light; and (4) misap-
propriation of a person’s name and likeness.”38 
However, the elements of these categories can 
be difficult for a public figure to satisfy.  For exam-
ple, in Howard v. Antilla, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit held that to establish a 
false light invasion of privacy action, the plaintiff 
had the burden of proving the statements were false 
and were made with actual malice.39  In this case, 
the defendant, a reporter for The New York Times, 
learned the plaintiff, Robert Howard, a chairman of 
two publicly traded companies, was in fact Howard 
Finkelstein.40  Finkelstein was convicted of “securi-
ties fraud, violation of the White Slave Act,41 con-
spiracy to defraud, and interstate transportation of 
                                                             
37 Id. 
38 Ignat v. Yum! Brands, Inc., 154 Cal. Rtpr. 3d 275, 279 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2013). 
39 Howard v. Antilla, 294 F.3d 244, 249 (2002) (holding that 
“only statements that are ‘provable as false’ are actionable. The 
plaintiff must also shoulder the burden of proving the falsity of 
each statement. Moreover, the plaintiff must prove that the 
offending statement was made with “actual malice”-that is, that 
the false statement was made intentionally or with reckless 
disregard as to whether it was false-and proof of that element 
must be established by the quantum of ‘convincing clarity.’”). 
40 Id. at 245. 
41 Also known as the Mann Act, this federal law prohibits the 
transportation of an individual in “interstate and foreign 
commerce for prostitution or other criminal sexual activity.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 822 (9th ed. 2009). 
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stolen property.”42  The defendant investigated the 
rumor but was unable to confirm or refute it.43  The 
article, entitled “Is Howard Really Finkelstein? Mon-
ey Rides on It,” was published.44 
However, after the story was published, 
Finkelstein’s attorney contacted the defendant and 
told her that his client and the plaintiff were not the 
same person.45  The Times then published a corrected 
version of the article, apologizing for publishing the 
story and stating that there was “‘no credible evi-
dence’ to support the rumor.”46  However, three years 
after the story was published, the plaintiff sued the 
defendant for, among other things, false light inva-
sion of privacy.47 
As a limited public figure, the plaintiff needed 
to demonstrate that the article was written with ac-
tual malice.48  The Court of Appeals held that a 
plaintiff could not prove actual malice by merely 
demonstrating that the defendant’s behavior was “an 
extreme departure from professional standards.”49  
The plaintiff must show that there was “sufficient 
evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant 
in fact entertained serious doubts to the truth of his 
publication or acted with a ‘high degree of awareness 
of . . . probable falsity.”50  Furthermore, “where the 
plaintiff is claiming injury from an allegedly harmful 
                                                             
42 Antilla, 294 F.3d at 245-46. 
43 Id. at 246. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 247. 
46 Id. at 247.  
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 249. 
49 Id. at 252 (quoting  Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665 (1989)). 
50 Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)). 
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implication arising from the defendant’s article, ‘he 
must show with clear and convincing evidence that 
the defendant intended or knew of the implications 
that the plaintiff is attempting to draw . . . .’. ”51 
The Court of Appeals did not agree with How-
ard that the article was capable of causing the public 
to believe that he was Finkelstein.52  The Court 
looked at the fact that article casted doubt on both 
the rumor and the defendant’s attempts to dispel the 
rumor.53  Furthermore, “the article remained ‘agnos-
tic’ with respect to the truth” of the rumor.54  As 
such, the Court held that actual malice was not es-
tablished because the “false accusation was not 
shown to be either intentional or treated with reck-
less disregard.”55 
As demonstrated in Antilla, it is difficult for 
public figures to bring a successful invasion of priva-
cy action against the paparazzi due to the “freedom 
of the press” clause.56  However, in a well-known pa-
                                                             
51 Id. (citing Saenz v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 
1314 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
52 Id. at 252. 
53 Id. (stating “it is questionable, even doubtful, that the 
article is actually capable of bearing the harmful implication 
charged by Howard – namely, that he is Finkelstein.”). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at  256. 
56 See Levesque v. Doocy, 560 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding 
that a news show host did not make false statements about a 
public official recklessly or with actual malice); Bernstein v. 
National Broadcasting Company, 129 F.Supp. 817 (D.D.C 1955) 
(holding that the press did not invade a public person’s privacy 
if they reported on a matter that was public at one time); see 
also Lauren N. Follett, Taming the Paparazzi in the “Wild 
West”: A look at California’s 2009 Amendment to the Anti-
Paparazzi Act and a Call for Increased Privacy Protections for 
Celebrity Children, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 201, 211 (2010)(“While 
celebrities have successfully obtained restraining orders against 
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parazzi case, Galella v. Onassis, the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit balanced a public person’s 
right to privacy with the media’s First Amendment 
right to gather news.57  As the wife of the late Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy, Jacqueline Onassis was a 
public figure.58  Despite her status as a public figure, 
the press did not have unlimited access into her 
life.59  Furthermore, the press could not engage in 
behavior that was outside the reasonable bounds of 
newsgathering such as, jumping into Onassis’ son’s 
path as he rode his bike to capture his picture.60  The 
                                                                                                                             
paparazzi, practical issues make injunctive relief ineffective in 
curbing the majority of paparazzi issues in California.  Not only 
must celebrities be able to identify a particular paparazzo in 
court, but there must also already have been an identifiable 
incident of harassment, and the celebrities must be able to 
convince the court that they are likely to succeed on the merits 
of the case without introducing discovery.  This leaves most 
celebrities without effective injunctive recourse against the 
paparazzi who place them under constant surveillance.”). 
57 Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). 
58 Id. at 995 (holding that “ legitimate countervailing social 
needs may warrant some intrusion despite an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy and freedom from 
harassment. However the interference allowed may be no 
greater than that necessary to protect the overriding public 
interest. Mrs. Onassis was properly found to be a public figure 
and thus subject to news coverage.”). 
59 Id. at 992. 
60 Id. (stating that “some examples of Galella’s conduct 
brought out at trial are illustrative.  Galella took pictures of 
John Kennedy riding his bicycle in Central Park across the way 
from his home.  He jumped out into the boy’s path, causing the 
agents concern for John’s safety.  The agents’ reaction and 
interrogation of Galella led to Galella’s arrest and his action 
against the agents; Galella on other occasions interrupted 
Caroline at tennis, and invaded the children’s private schools.  
At one time he came uncomfortably close in a power boat to 
Mrs. Onassis swimming.  He often jumped and postured around 
while taking pictures of her party notably at a theater opening 
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Court of Appeals held that the photographer’s con-
duct was outside of the “reasonable bounds of news-
gathering.”61  They also found that injunctive relief 
was appropriate but needed to be “tailored to protect 
Mrs. Onassis from the ‘paparazzo’ attack which dis-
tinguishes Galella’s behavior from that of other pho-
tographers” and “it should not unnecessarily infringe 
on reasonable efforts to ‘cover’ defendant.”62  The in-
junctive relief prohibited “(1) any approach within 
twenty-five (25) feet of defendant or any touching of 
the person of the defendant Jacqueline Onassis; (2) 
any blocking of her movement in public places and 
thoroughfares; (3) any act foreseeably or reasonably 
calculated to place the life and safety of defendant in 
jeopardy; and (4) any conduct which would reasona-
bly be foreseen to harass, alarm or frighten the de-
fendant.”63 
 Gallela demonstrates that there can be a bal-
ance between a celebrity’s right to privacy and the 
press’ right to gather and publish the news.  The 
Court recognized that Gallela’s methods was danger-
ous and outside of the reasonable bounds of news-
gathering.  As such, the Court structured the injunc-
tive relief to balance the rights of the media and that 
of the celebrity.  California’s amended law criminal-
izes the same methods Gallela used to capture Mrs. 
Onassis and her children’s images.  Whether the 
amended statute will be enforced, depends on wheth-
er the statute gives clear notice of the prohibited be-
                                                                                                                             
but also on numerous other occasions.  He followed a practice of 
bribing apartment house, restaurant and nightclub doormen as 
well as romancing a family servant to keep him advised of the 
movements of the family.”). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 995.  
63 Id. 
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havior.  If it fails to do so, that statute will be invalid 
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.  
 
II. DISCUSSION OF A.B. 3592, CODIFIED AS PENAL 
CODE § 11411 
In 1994, California passed A.B. 3592 to protect 
children of health care service workers from being 
harassed as a result of their parents’ occupation.  
The bill was drafted as a result of a 1993 Clinic Vio-
lence Survey Report that showed increasing anti-
abortion violence towards medical staff throughout 
the country.64 The violence was not only directed to-
wards medical staff but also their families.65 One 
abortion clinic reported that the life of a director’s 
child was threatened so that “she can see how it 
feels.”66 California recognized that this type of behav-
ior could not be tolerated and the bill was signed into 
law and codified as California Penal Code Section 
11414.  It read: 
 
(a) Any person who intentionally harasses 
the child or ward of any other person be-
cause of that person’s employment, is guilty 
of a misdemeanor. 
 
(b) For purposes of this section, the follow-
ing definitions shall apply: 
(1) “Child” and “ward” mean a per-
son under the age of 16 years. 
(2) “Harasses” means knowing and 
willful conduct directed at a specific 
child that seriously alarms, annoys, 
torments, or terrorizes the child, and 
                                                             
64 Bill Analysis of A.B.. 3592 Before the Assemb. Comm. of 
Pub. Safety, 1993-94 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
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that serves no legitimate purpose. 
The conduct must be such as would 
cause a reasonable child to suffer 
substantial emotional distress, and 
actually cause the victim to suffer 
substantial emotional distress. 
 
(c) A second conviction under this section 
shall be punished by imprisonment in a 
county jail for not less than five days. A 
third or subsequent conviction under this 
section shall be punished by imprisonment 
in a county jail for not less than 30 days.67 
 
In summary, under this statute, anyone in vio-
lation was guilty of a misdemeanor.68  In California, 
generally speaking, punishment for a misdemeanor 
could result in imprisonment, not exceeding six 
months, or a fine, not exceeding one thousand dol-
lars, or both.69  A second conviction resulted in man-
datory imprisonment in county jail for five days or 
more.70  For subsequent convictions, imprisonment 
for 30 days or more was mandatory.71 
Despite the purpose of the statute, the 1994 
California Legislature designed the law so that it ap-
plied to all children, not just children of health care 
service providers.72  As a result, this statute sought 
to protect children who were harassed, regardless of 
                                                             
67  CAL. PENAL CODE § 11414 (West, Westlaw through 
ch. 16 of 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
68 Id. 
69 CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (West, Westlaw through ch. 16 of 
2014 Reg. Sess.). 
70 PENAL § 11414 (Westlaw). 
71 Id. 
72 Bill Analysis of A.B 3592 Before S. Comm. on Judiciary, 
1993-94 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994). 
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their parents’ employment.  Prior to its enactment, 
California’s Senate Committee on Judiciary 
acknowledged that this bill might be challenged be-
cause it criminalized First Amendment protected 
conduct.73  However, for the nineteen years the bill 
existed, it was never challenged. 
 
III. DISCUSSION OF S.B. 606 
Nineteen years after the enactment of Califor-
nia Penal Code Section 11414, some California resi-
dents did not believe the statute’s penalties were ef-
fective in deterring people from harassing their chil-
dren.  In early 2013, a very famous resident of Cali-
fornia, Halle Berry, met with California State Sena-
tor Kevin de Leon.74  At the meeting, Ms. Berry ex-
pressed the need for protection from paparazzi who 
“stalked and harassed” children of celebrities for 
their photographs.75  She also emphasized the need 
for a bill that would deter the paparazzi from harass-
ing children because “she and other parents had no 
real recourse to protect their children.”76 
Ms. Berry’s demand for protection was a result 
of her personal experience.  There are numerous sto-
ries in the media about Ms. Berry’s violent interac-
tions with the paparazzi because of their unrelenting 
attempts to photograph her and her daughter.  In 
May 2012, Ms. Berry lashed out on the paparazzi af-
                                                             
73 Id. 
74 Release: Paparazzi Harassment Deterrent Bill Signed by the 
Governor – Increases Penalties & Allows for Civil Action to 
Protect Children, STATE SEN. KEVIN DE LEÓN (Sept. 24, 2103), 
http://sd22.senate.ca.gov/news/2013-09-24-release-paparazzi-
harassment-deterrent-bill-signed-governor-increases-penalties-
allo. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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ter they camped out in front of her daughter’s pre-
school.77  In an interview with the television show 
Extra, regarding the incident, Ms. Berry said that 
she had been “struggling for years” to keep her 
daughter safe from the paparazzi.78  She also stated 
that “[t]here are no laws [. . .] that protect our chil-
dren and as a mom, coming to the school . . . not only 
my child, but all the children that are there. It’s just 
wrong, wrong, wrong.”79 
Senator de Leon ultimately agreed that the 
current law was ineffective in protecting children of 
public figures from harassment.  He introduced S.B. 
606, as an amendment to California’s Penal Code 
Section 11414, on February 22, 2013.80  In a press 
release, he stated that children should not be “sub-
jected to such unwarranted and harmful persecution” 
because of their parent’s occupations.81  He believed 
that by increasing the penalties and allowing parents 
to have access to a civil cause of action, the amended 
bill would deter “those who would consider torment-
ing the most vulnerable and defenseless members of 
our society.”82 
Ms. Berry aggressively advocated for the pas-
                                                             
77 Halle Berry on Paparazzi Blowup: ‘When It Comes to My 
Daughter, I’m Ferocious!’, EXTRA (May 14, 2012) 
http://www.extratv.com/2012/05/14/halle-berry-on-paparazzi-
blow-up-when-it-comes-to-my-daughter-im-ferocious/. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Release: Paparazzi Harassment Deterrent Bill Passes to 
Protect Children - SB 606 Increases Penalties & Allows for Civil 
Action, STATE SEN. KEVIN DE LEÓN, (Sept. 6, 2013), 
http://sd22.senate.ca.gov/news/2013-09-06-release-paparazzi-
harassment-deterrent-bill-passes-protect-children-sb-606-
increases. 
81 Id.  
82 Id. 
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sage of the proposed amendment and sought the 
support of fellow thespians.  In August 2013, Jen-
nifer Garner joined Ms. Berry to testify in front of 
California’s Assembly Judiciary Committee and the 
State Assembly Committee on Public Safety to sup-
port the amendment.  Ms. Garner described how the 
paparazzi aggressively followed her and her children 
on a daily basis.83  She also stated that although she 
chose a public life, her children did not and she does 
not “want a gang of shouting, arguing, law-breaking 
photographers who camp out everywhere [her family 
is] all day, every day, to continue traumatizing [her] 
kids.”84  Ms. Berry testified that her daughter was 
terrified to go to school because the paparazzi were 
always watching her and jumping out of bushes and 
from behind vehicles to get a photo of her child.85  
She also stated that a photographer asked her 
daughter how she felt that she might never see her 
father again, after it was reported that Ms. Berry 
was seeking permission from a court to move her 
daughter to France.86  The paparazzi would also 
curse and call Ms. Berry names to provoke a re-
sponse from her while she was with her daughter, 
she testified.87 
Although media reports and legislative history 
show that the amendment was motivated by the 
                                                             
83 Id. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
87 Natalie Finn, Halle Berry & Jennifer Garner Join Forces to 
Support Anti-Paparazzi Bill That Would Make Photographing 
Their Kids a Crime, E! ONLINE (Aug. 13, 2013, 6:56 PM), 
http://www.eonline.com/news/448665/halle-berry-jennifer-
garner-join-forces-to-support-anti-paparazzi-bill-that-would-
make-photographing-their-kids-a-crime. 
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need to protect children of public figures, the statute 
was not only designed to protect children of celebri-
ties.  The statute protects all children who are har-
assed because of their parents’ occupations, especial-
ly law enforcement officials, who are big supporters 
of this amendment after the violence committed by 
Dorner.  The Chair of the Assembly Committee on 
Judiciary, Bob Wieckowiski, wrote that the author of 
the existing law, former Assemblyman Tom Umberg, 
“sees [S.B. 606] as a logical extension of the earlier 
legislation, since children of many other occupations 
– including law enforcement officers, psychologist or 
psychiatrists, or others engaged in high-profile or 
controversial occupations – could also be vulnera-
ble.”88  Some of the other supporters of this amend-
ment include the Screen Actors Guild, California 
Medical Association, and the California Psychological 
Association.  These organizations recognize that the 
law needs to protect children from the “dangerous 
actions of out of control members of the paparazzi” 
and, according to the Screen Actors Guild, S.B. 606 is 
“appropriately balanced and limited in that it ex-
empts legitimate activities, including transmission, 
publishing, and broadcasting.”89 
In September 2013, the amendment, S.B. 606, 
to Penal Code Section 11414 unanimously passed 
through California’s State Assembly and Senate.  On 
September 24, 2013, California’s Governor signed the 
                                                             
88 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. Comm. on 
Judiciary, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 6 (Cal. 2013). 
89 Id.; Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. 
Comm. on Appropriations, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 
2013). 
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bill into law.90  Beginning January 1, 2014, Penal 
Code Section 11414 now reads: 
 
11414. SEC. 1. 
(a) Any person who intentionally harasses 
the child or ward of any other person 
because of that person’s employment 
shall be punished by imprisonment in a 
county jail not exceeding one year, or by 
a fine not exceeding ten thousand dol-
lars ($10,000), or by both that fine and 
imprisonment. 
(b) For purposes of this section, the follow-
ing definitions shall apply: 
(1) “Child” and “ward” mean a person 
under 16 years of age. 
(2) “Harasses” means knowing and will-
ful conduct directed at a specific 
child or ward that seriously alarms, 
annoys, torments, or terrorizes the 
child or ward, and that serves no le-
gitimate purpose, including, but not 
limited to, that conduct occurring 
during the course of any actual or 
attempted recording of the child’s or 
ward’s image or voice, or both, with-
out the express consent of the parent 
or legal guardian of the child or 
ward, by following the child’s or 
ward’s activities or by lying in wait. 
The conduct must be such as would 
cause a reasonable child to suffer 
substantial emotional distress, and 
actually cause the victim to suffer 
substantial emotional distress. 
                                                             
90 Release: Paparazzi Harassment Deterrent Bill Passes to 
Protect Children - SB 606 Increases Penalties & Allows for Civil 
Action, supra note 80; McGreevy & Mason, supra note 80. 
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(3) “Employment” means the job, voca-
tion, occupation, or profession of the 
parent or legal guardian of the child 
or ward. 
(c) A second conviction under this section 
shall be punished by a fine not exceed-
ing twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) 
and by imprisonment in a county jail for 
not less than five days but not exceeding 
one year. A third or subsequent convic-
tion under this section shall be punished 
by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand 
dollars ($30,000) and by imprisonment 
in a county jail for not less than 30 days 
but not exceeding one year. 
(d) Upon a violation of this section, the par-
ent or legal guardian of an aggrieved 
child or ward may bring a civil action 
against the violator on behalf of the 
child or ward. The remedies in that civil 
action shall be limited to one or more of 
the following: actual damages, punitive 
damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, 
costs, disgorgement of any compensation 
from the sale, license, or dissemination 
of a child’s image or voice received by 
the individual who, in violation of this 
section, recorded the child’s image or 
voice, and injunctive relief against fur-
ther violations of this section by the in-
dividual. 
(e) The act of transmitting, publishing, or 
broadcasting a recording of the image or 
voice of a child does not constitute a vio-
lation of this section. 
(f) This section does not preclude prosecu-
tion under any section of law that pro-
vides for greater punishment. 
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SEC. 2. No reimbursement is required by 
this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article 
XIII B of the California Constitution be-
cause the only costs that may be incurred 
by a local agency or school district will be 
incurred because this act creates a new 
crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or 
infraction, or changes the penalty for a 
crime or infraction, within the meaning of 
Section 17556 of the Government Code, or 
changes the definition of a crime within the 
meaning of Section 6 of Article XIII B of the 
California Constitution.91 
 
In summary, there are three major changes to 
the existing law.  First, the criminal penalties are 
harsher than a misdemeanor.  Anyone who violates 
this law could face up to a year in jail as well as a fi-
ne of up to $10,000 for a first conviction.  The penal-
ties increase for repeat violations.  The second 
change to the statute is that it allows a parent or 
guardian to bring a civil action against any viola-
tors.92  The third change, and a source of potential 
litigation, is that the amendment expands the defini-
tion of “harassment” to include “conduct occurring 
during the course of any actual or attempted record-
ing of the child’s or ward’s image or voice, or both, 
without the express consent of the parent or legal 
guardian of the child or ward, by following the child’s 
or ward’s activities or by lying in wait.”93  Further-
more, “[t]he conduct must be such as would cause a 
reasonable child to suffer substantial emotional dis-
tress, and actually cause the victim to suffer sub-
                                                             
91  CAL. PENAL CODE § 11414 (West, Westlaw through 
ch. 16 of 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
92 Id.  
93 Id. 
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stantial emotional distress.”94 
 The amended law does not prevent the papa-
razzi from taking pictures of a celebrity’s child.95  Ra-
ther, it prohibits the dangerous methods the papa-
razzi use to photograph a child of a celebrity.96  As 
discussed in Part I of this paper, it is difficult to draft 
a bill that would prevent the paparazzi from taking a 
picture of a celebrity in a public place, even if that 
picture is of the celebrity’s child.  Lawmakers are 
very limited in how they can restrict the paparazzi 
when it comes to photographing public figures. There 
is a very thin line between protecting celebrities’ pri-
vacy and the paparazzi’s right to gather news. The 
California’s Legislature believes the amended law 
balances both the celebrity’s limited right to privacy 
and the press’ right to gather news. 
 
IV. CRITICISM OF S.B. 606 
However, the California Newspapers Publish-
ers Association (CNPA), the National Press Photog-
raphers Association (NPPA) and the California 
Broadcasters Association (CBA) argued that the 
amended law infringes on constitutional rights of the 
press.97  The CNPA raised First Amendment con-
cerns with amended law.  They argued that “the in-
                                                             
94 Id. 
95 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. Comm. on 
Judiciary, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 4 (Cal. 2013) (stating that 
“[a]lthough the bill creates enhanced criminal penalties and a 
new civil cause of action, it arguably makes no change as to 
what constitutes an underlying offense. To begin with, the bill 
does not – as some of the opposition letters suggest – make it 
misdemeanor harassment to simply take a photograph of a 
child without the consent of the parent or guardian, either by 
following the child or by lying in wait.”). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 7. 
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creased penalties and liabilities . . . improperly 
abridge First Amendment protected newsgathering 
activity that occurs in public places where a person 
normally has no reasonable expectation of privacy.”98  
The CNPA further argued that the amendment “per-
tain[ing] to photography and recording is overly 
broad [and] vague.”99 
The NPPA agreed with the CNPA but also 
raised two separate constitutional arguments.  The 
first is that the amended law “raises First Amend-
ment concerns by singling out attempts to take a 
photograph – an activity commonly done for valid 
newsgathering or expressive activities, especially if 
the attempt to take the photograph is in a public 
place where there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”100  The second argument is that the 
amendment’s definition of “harass” is vague and sub-
jective because the terms, “harassment,” “annoys and 
alarms,” and “no legitimate purpose,” which are used 
to define it, are vague.101  Furthermore, NPPA does 
not see a need for this amendment since California 
has laws on the books that address harassment con-
cerns.102  Along with the CNPA, the NPPA argued 
that the additional enhanced criminal penalties, 
along with a new civil cause of action, will “further 
chill free speech and create uncertainty.”103 
 In the legislative hearing reports, constitu-
tional law Professor Erwin Chemerinsky disagreed 
with the opponent’s vagueness and First Amendment 
                                                             
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. Comm. 
on Pub. Safety, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 5 (Cal. 2013). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
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arguments. In response to the First Amendment con-
cerns, Professor Chemerinsky, a renowned constitu-
tional law professor at University of California-
Irvine, argued that there is no substantial First 
Amendment issue “because the bill targets only har-
assing conduct, not constitutionally protected expres-
sion.”104  Professor Chemerinsky supported his claim 
by stating that there is no constitutional right to 
harass.105  However, he failed to explain his conclu-
sion that the amended statute was not vague. 
California’s Assembly Committee on Public 
Safety disagrees that the definitions of ‘harass’ sin-
gles out journalistic activity.106  The Committee be-
lieves that the statute merely lists a form of journal-
istic activity as an example of the kinds of conduct 
that could rise to the level of harassment.107  Essen-
tially, the phrase “any actual or attempted recording 
of the child’s or ward’s image or voice” is simply an 
example of the kind of activity that could be consid-
ered harassment.108  The Committee recognizes that 
if the statute singles out journalistic activity, the 
statute may be unconstitutional because the Su-
preme Court has previously held that statutes that 
single out journalistic activities and subject it to 
heightened punishment are unconstitutional.109  Ac-
                                                             
104 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. Comm. 
on Judiciary, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 5 (Cal. 2013). 
105 Id. 
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 6. 
108 CAL. PENAL CODE § 11414 (West, Westlaw through 
ch. 16 of 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
109 Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm’r of 
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586 (1983) (holding that “the main 
interest asserted by Minnesota in this case is the raising of 
revenue. Of course that interest is critical to any government. 
Standing alone, however, it cannot justify the special treatment 
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cordingly, the statute was designed to punish anyone 
who violates it.  Not just members of the press.  
In addition to the First Amendment challenges 
that can be made to the amendment, the opponents 
argue that this amendment is unconstitutionally 
vague.  However, I contend that, despite the oppo-
nents’ arguments, this statute is not unconstitution-
ally vague as applied to the press.  The purpose of 
determining whether the statute is vague is not to 
rid the California law books of this crime.  Rather, 
because there is a need to protect children from the 
dangerous conduct of the paparazzi, it is very im-
portant that the statute is clear in what behavior it 
is prohibiting.  The amendment clearly articulates 
the type of conduct it prohibits.  In the remainder of 
this Note, I will demonstrate that this statute does 
not violate the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 
 
V. TOO VAGUE TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL 
The amended California Penal Code Section 
11414 terms “annoys,” “alarms,” “torments,” and 
“terrorizes,” despite the opponents’ claims, are not 
void under the vagueness doctrine because the terms 
provide adequate notice of the prohibited conduct.  
Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, “a statute 
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in 
terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as 
to its application violates the first essential of due 
process of law,” especially if it is a criminal stat-
                                                                                                                             
of the press, for an alternative means of achieving the same 
interest without raising concerns under the First Amendment is 
clearly available: the State could raise the revenue by taxing 
businesses generally, avoiding the censorial threat implicit in a 
tax that singles out the press.”). 
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ute.110  In Kolender v. Lawson, the Court used a two-
pronged test to determine whether a statute failed 
the void-for-vagueness doctrine.111  Under the first 
prong, a criminal statute must define the offense 
with “sufficient definiteness” so that a layperson 
knows what conduct is prohibited.112  Under the sec-
ond prong, the statute must comply with the first 
prong “in a manner that does not encourage arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement.”113  The 
Court, interpreted the second prong to “[require] that 
a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern 
law enforcement” and considered this to be the most 
important part of the test.114 
This test must be met so that a criminal stat-
ute provides for fair enforcement and notice of the 
prohibited conduct.115  In City of Chicago v. Morales, 
an ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it 
failed to establish minimal guidelines for enforce-
ment.  In an effort to rid the city of gang activity, 
Chicago enacted the Gang Congregation Ordi-
nance116 to prevent gang members from loitering in 
                                                             
110 Connally v. General Construction, 269 U.S. 385, 391 
(1926). 
111 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574(1974)). 
115 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICES 970 (Vicki Been et al., eds., 4th ed. 2011) (“In, 
part, the vagueness doctrine is about fairness; it is to unjust to 
punish a person without providing clear notice as to what 
conduct was prohibited.  Vague laws also risk selective 
prosecution; under vague statutes and ordinances the 
government can choose who to prosecute based on their views of 
the policies.”). 
116 The ordinance provides that “[w]henever a police officer 
observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a criminal 
street gang member loitering in any public place with one or 
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the public.117  The Supreme Court found that the 
statute covered additional activities besides the con-
gregation of gang members for the purpose of engag-
ing in illegal activity.118  It was this “uncertainty 
about the scope of [the] additional coverage [that] 
provide[d] the basis” of the vagueness claim.119  The 
Court applied the two-prong test articulated in 
Kolender to determine whether the statute was 
vague.120 
As to whether the ordinance provided “sufficient 
definiteness” or fair notice to a layperson, the Court 
looked to the meaning of the term “loiter,” which 
meant, “to remain in any one place with no apparent 
purpose.”121  According to the Court, the term “ap-
parent purpose” was unclear, stating that “[i]t [was] 
difficult to imagine how any citizen of the city of Chi-
cago standing in a public place with a group of people 
would know if he or she had an “apparent pur-
pose.”122  To illustrate its point, the Court asked two 
hypothetical questions: “[i]f she were talking to an-
other person, would she have an apparent purpose?  
If she were frequently checking her watch and look-
ing expectantly down the street, would she have an 
apparent purpose?”  The Court doubted the city 
meant to criminalize every instance in which a per-
son stands with a gang member.123  For that reason, 
                                                                                                                             
more other persons, he shall order all such persons to disperse 
and remove themselves from the area. Any person who does not 
promptly obey such an order is in violation of this section.”  City 
of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 65 (1999). 
117 Id. at 45-46. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 56. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. at 57. 
123 Id. 
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the statute failed the first prong because the term 
“loiter” did not distinguish between loitering with a 
criminal purpose and loitering with an innocent pur-
pose.124 
Under the second prong, the Court held that the 
ordinance failed to provide minimum guidelines to 
govern law enforcement, which would prevent arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement.125  As a result, 
a police officer could instruct a gang member stand-
ing in a public place to disperse without determining 
the person’s reason for standing in that public 
place.126  According to the Court, the language of the 
ordinance directing a police officer to issue an order 
without inquiry was too broad.  Furthermore, a stat-
ute that allowed too much discretion was prohibited 
because the “Constitution does not permit a legisla-
ture to ‘set a net large enough to catch all possible 
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and 
say who could be rightfully detained, and who should 
be set at large.’”127  For example, the statute did not 
take into consideration that a gang member could be 
standing in front of a place with a relative for rea-
                                                             
124 Id. (The Court also stated that “[t]he Illinois Supreme 
Court emphasized the law’s failure to distinguish between 
innocent conduct and conduct threatening harm. Its decision 
followed the precedent set by a number of state courts that have 
upheld ordinances that criminalize loitering combined with 
some other overt act or evidence of criminal intent. However, 
state courts have uniformly invalidated laws that do not join 
the term ‘loitering’ with a second specific element of the crime.”) 
125 Id. at 60 (“The broad sweep of the ordinance also violates 
‘the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines 
to govern law enforcement.’ There are no such guidelines in the 
ordinance.”(quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 358)). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 
(1876)). 
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sons that were not criminal.128  Under the ordinance, 
if a police officer ordered the gang member in the 
preceding example to leave the area and he refused 
to do so, he would be arrested, even though he was 
not loitering for criminal purposes.  Since there were 
no guidelines in the ordinance, the statute violated 
the void-for-vagueness doctrine.129 
 As explained by the Supreme Court in Mo-
rales, a statute will be upheld under the void-for-
vagueness doctrine as long as the terms are not too 
subjective.  For example, in People v. Ewing, the Cal-
ifornia’s Court of Appeals for the Fourth District up-
held a harassment statute because the terms were 
clear, understandable and not subjective and it pro-
vided an objective standard to guide the public.130  In 
this case, the defendant argued that a stalking stat-
ute was unconstitutionally vague because the terms 
“alarms,” “annoys,” “torments,” and “terrorizes” in 
the “harass” section of the statute “[were] subjective 
terms that [did] not provide adequate notice for an 
individual to avoid liability under the statute.”131  To 
determine whether that terms were vague, the court 
stated that it “must view a statute from the ‘stand-
point of the reasonable person who might be subject 
to its terms’ and uphold the statute if its meaning is 
                                                             
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 People v. Ewing, 90 Cal Rptr. 2d 177, 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1999). 
131 Id. at 181. (Section 649.9 provided that “[f]or the  purposes 
of this section, ‘harasses’ means a knowing and willful course of 
conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, 
annoys, torments, or terrorizes the person, and that serves no 
legitimate purpose. This course of conduct must be such as 
would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional 
distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress 
to the person.”). 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014) 
Protecting a Celebrity’s Child From Harassment 
592 
reasonably ascertainable.”132  This is required be-
cause the courts recognize that there will be some 
ambiguity in a statute because of the difficulty in 
“defining the subject matter with precision” and as 
long as the meaning is reasonably ascertainable, the 
statute will be upheld.133 
In Ewing, the Court look to Webster’s diction-
ary to define each of the terms and concluded, that 
along with the term “seriously” and the reasonable 
person standard, the definition of “harass,” provided 
a clear standard of conduct that a man of ordinary 
intelligence will understand the behavior the law 
prohibits.134  According to the court, the terms 
                                                             
132 Id. at 182 (quoting People v. Deskin, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391, 
392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
133 Deskin, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392. 
134 Ewing, 90 Cal Rptr. 2d at 182-83 (stating that, “[t]he 
definition of ‘alarm’ is “to strike with fear: fill with anxiety.  
‘Annoy’ is defined as ‘to irritate with a nettling or exasperating 
effect.’  The definition of ‘torment’ is ‘to cause (someone) severe 
suffering of body or mind: inflict pain or anguish on.’  The 
definition of ‘terrorize’ is ‘to fill with terror or anxiety’; ‘terror’ is 
defined as ‘a state of intense fright or apprehension.’  Moreover, 
these terms as they appear in the statute cannot be read in a 
vacuum.  First, we note they are preceded and qualified with 
the adverb ‘seriously.’  Thus, the statutory definition of 
‘harasses’ [. . .] refers to ‘a knowing and willful course of conduct 
directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, seriously 
annoys, seriously torments, or seriously terrorizes the person’ 
against whom it is directed.  Second, when the reasonable 
person standard is factored in, the statutory definition of 
‘harasses’ becomes ‘a knowing and willful course of conduct 
directed at a specific person that a reasonable person would 
consider as seriously alarming , seriously annoying, seriously 
tormenting, or seriously terrorizing the person.’ added.)  Third, 
[the statute] explicitly provides the ‘course of conduct must be 
such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial 
emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial 
emotional distress to the person.’  Thus, a reasonable person 
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“alarms,” “annoys,” “torments,” and “terrorizes” and 
could not be read separately.135  First, the terms 
were “preceded and qualified with the adverb ‘seri-
ously.’”136  The word “seriously” limited the applica-
tion of the statute. As such, the statute would be en-
forced against a person who seriously, rather than 
trivially, annoyed, alarmed, tormented, or terrorized 
another.  In addition, whether a person seriously an-
noyed, alarmed, tormented, or terrorized another to 
the extent of causing substantial emotional distress 
depended on whether a reasonable person would find 
the defendant’s conduct offensive.137  According to 
the court, the objective standard served the purpose 
of eliminating “the spectrum of possible subjective 
reactions by a targeted person.”138  Construed in this 
light, the harassment statute is clear and certain.139 
Without ascertainable standards to limit the 
application of a statute, a statute will be invalid un-
der the void-for-vagueness doctrine.  For example, in 
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the Court held that 
terms such as “annoys” are vague if they are not 
paired with an objective standard to determining 
whether the act is “annoying.”  In this case, the Cin-
                                                                                                                             
standard also applies to the victim, which eliminates the 
spectrum of possible subjective reactions by a targeted person to 
defendant’s course of conduct.  The result is the stalking statute 
prohibits a course of conduct directed at a specific person that a 
reasonable person would consider as seriously alarming, 
seriously annoying, or seriously tormenting a reasonable person.  
Given this context, the statutory definition of ‘harasses’—based 
on the four challenged words—is not uncertain.”) (alterations in 
original) (citations omitted). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
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cinnati ordinance prohibited “three or more persons 
[from] assemb[ling] . . . on any of the sidewalks, . . . 
and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying 
to persons passing by.”140  The Court held that the 
ordinance failed the void-for-vagueness doctrine “be-
cause it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly 
to an [unascertainable] standard.”141  The statute 
failed to consider that there were behaviors that an-
noy some people but do not annoy others.142  There-
fore, the ordinance violated the first prong of the 
Kolender test because “men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning.”143 
To determine whether Penal Code Section 
11414 provides “sufficient definiteness,” the terms 
must be clear enough for a man of ordinary intelli-
gence to understand what is prohibited.  The analy-
sis for determining whether Penal Code Section 
11414 is vague is similar to the analysis in Ewing.  
“Annoy” is defined as “to cause irritation to by irri-
tating acts.”144  “Alarm” is defined as “to fill with 
alarm; frighten.”145  “Torment” is defined as “to cause 
to undergo physical or mental torture.”146  Finally, 
“terrorize” is defined as “to fill or overpower with ter-
ror.”147  As stated in Ewing, these terms cannot be 
looked at in a vacuum.  The terms are preceded with 
the word “seriously.”  This term works to limit the 
                                                             
140 Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (fourth 
alteration in original). 
141 Id. at 614.  
142 Id. 
143 Id. (quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 
U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). 
144THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 57 (4th ed. 
2004). 
145 Id. at 31. 
146 Id. at 1451. 
147 Id. at 1423. 
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application of the statute to only the offenses that 
seriously annoys, alarms, terrorizes, or torments a 
child.  Furthermore, as required by the Supreme 
Court in Coates, the statue provides an objective 
standard in determining whether a person violated 
this statute.  As such, the statute prohibits a person 
from seriously annoying, alarming, terrorizing, or 
tormenting a child to the extent that a reasonable 
child would suffer substantial emotional distress.  
Read in this context, the statue is clear and provides 
sufficient definiteness. 
The second prong of the Kolender test requires 
that the statute provide minimum guidelines to gov-
ern law enforcement to prevent arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement.  In Morales, the Court held 
that the statute failed the second prong of the void-
for-vagueness test because the statue provided law 
enforcement officers with too much discretion.  Penal 
Code Section 11414 instructs law enforcement offic-
ers to arrest anyone who knowingly and intentionally 
harasses a child because of his or her parents’ occu-
pations.  Unlike the statute in Morales, the amend-
ment specifically explains what conduct is criminal-
ized: harassing a child because of her parents’ occu-
pations.  In Morales, the statute prohibited standing 
in a public place for no apparent purpose, but the 
statute did not instruct law enforcement officers to 
determine whether they had an innocent reason for 
standing around.  Unlike harassment, there is a con-
stitutional right to assemble.148  A statute cannot in-
                                                             
148 U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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fringe on that right.  As stated by Professor Chemer-
insky, there is no constitutional right to harass.149  
Therefore, states can criminalize the conduct.  In this 
case, a police officer is instructed to arrest someone 
who is engaging in criminal conduct: harassment.  
The amended statute does not provide unlimited dis-
cretion like the statute provided in Morales.  As a re-
sult, it is very likely that a court will determine that 
Penal Code Section 11414, as amended, complies 
with the second prong of the Kolender test. 
 There are additional constitutional challenges 
that may impact the enforcement of the amendment.  
However, it is very unlikely that a court will void 
this statue because the terms used to define “harass” 
are vague.  The amended statute is very similar to 
the statute in Ewing.  The opponents of the amend-
ment argue that the terms used to define “harass” 
are vague.  However, as demonstrated, the terms 
“annoys, ” “alarms,” “torments,” and “terrorizes,” 
read in context of the entire statute, clearly identifies 
the prohibited conduct so that a layperson under-
stands what conduct is prohibited and it provides 
minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement. 
 
CONCLUSION 
California has a legitimate concern to protect 
the emotional, psychological, and physical well-being 
of a child.  In recent years, there have been violent 
interactions with the press that result in injury and 
even death.  California has made numerous attempts 
to curb the behavior of the press, however, many of 
these attempts infringed on the press’ constitutional 
rights.  This statute criminalizes conduct that is not 
                                                             
149 Bill Analysis of S.B. 606 Before the 2013 Assemb. Comm. 
on Judiciary, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. 5 (Cal. 2013). 
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protected by the Constitution: harassment.  The 
Statute is currently in effect.  Time will tell whether 
this statute is effective in deterring the paparazzi 
and other overzealous individuals. 
